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COMMENTARY
German Council on Foreign Relations
Presidential Election 
in Belarus
Tensions Are Likely to Prevail
The impending presidential elec-
tion in Belarus on August 9, 2020, 
is highly likely to result in the smooth 
victory of  incumbent Alexandr 
Lukashenko. Despite this fact, the 
unprecedented – and still growing – 
politicization of Belarusian society 
constitutes a challenge to the regime 
that will not fade even after a clear-
cut election. The resulting tensions 
will require more diplomatic atten-
tion from Germany and the Europe-
an Union.
From the perspective of President 
Alexandr Lukashenko, who has been 
ruling Belarus for 26 years, the stage 
is well set for another victory. None of 
the three most powerful potential op-
position leaders are allowed to par-
ticipate in the election this Sunday. 
Nevertheless, with his popular support 
hitting a historical low and after an un-
precedented mobilization of Belarusian 
society, Lukashenko’s regime is facing 
a real dilemma. While the Belarusian 
political system, which was skillfully 
developed over the last two decades to 
ensure the continuity of Lukashenko’s 
power, is still highly likely to deliver 
the official election results for which it 
was created, it is questionable whether 
and how it will perform after the vote. 
The same political machinery that was 
designed to effectively handle a largely 
passive population will then need to 
cope with an active, mobilized elector-
ate, which demands more representa-
tion and cannot be repressed due to 
current geopolitical considerations. In 
order to counterbalance growing pres-
sure from Russia after its illegal annex-
ation of Crimea in 2014, Lukashenko’s 
regime has needed to improve its pre-
viously icy relations with the West. 
Severe repression would, therefore, be 
counterproductive.
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PLEASE NOTE:  
The Republic of Belarus rec-
ognizes two official languages, 
Belarusian and Russian. The 
choice of transliterating Belaru-
sian names on the basis of their 
Russian equivalents was made 
here in order to help the wider 
public more easily comprehend 
the situation in Belarus; thus, it 
does not represent any political 
or other preference.
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Only a few weeks after EU-Belarus visa 
facilitation came into force on July 1, 
2020, the impending presidential elec-
tion now poses a significant challenge 
to the cautious normalization that has 
been developing between the Europe-
an Union and Belarus. Especially given 
Germany’s presidency of the EU Coun-
cil, German diplomacy, which has al-
ready played an important role in this 
process, will be needed more than ever 
in the aftermath of this election – par-
ticularly if any major crisis occurs.
“THREE LADIES” REPLACE 
THE ESTABLISHED  
POLITICAL OPPOSITION
The biggest challenge to Lukashen-
ko’s system is not the traditional politi-
cal opposition but rather the increased 
political activism of Belarusian soci-
ety that is fueled by economic hard-
ship as well as the regime’s denials of 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Even when 
Lukashenko’s regime made it impos-
sible for the three most powerful po-
tential opposition candidates – blogger 
Sergei Tikhanovksy, former regime in-
sider Viktor Babariko, and former Be-
larusian ambassador to Washington 
Valery Tsepkalo – to run in the elec-
tion, it could not prevent bottom-up 
mobilization. 
Tikhanovksy could not register as a 
candidate because he has been in ad-
ministrative arrest since May 6, 2020. 
Babariko, who previously headed the 
Belgazprombank, was arrested on 
fraud-related charges on June 18 and 
banned from registering. Tsepkalo, 
who also founded Belarus’s Hi-Tech 
Park, was prevented from running. In 
his case, the Central Elections Com-
mission (CEC) invalidated so ma-
ny of the 160,000 signatures that he 
submitted to recommend his candi-
dacy that he could not pass the nom-
ination threshold of 100,000. Although 
three other opposition candidates 
(Andrei Dmitriev, Anna Konopatskaya, 
and Sergei Cherechen) did make it on-
to the ballots, their popularity and po-
tential to mobilize voters are miniscule 
compared either to Lukashenko or 
any of these three banned opposition 
figures.
Still, there is a fourth opposition can-
didate indeed worth noting: Svetlana 
Tikhanovskaya, the wife of banned 
candidate Sergei Tikhanovksy, who 
made a brave, sudden move to be-
come an official presidential can-
didate in his stead. Unprecedented 
crowds of tens of thousands of people 
have attended Tikhanovskaya’s rallies, 
in which she appears together with 
Veronika Tsepkalo, the wife of banned 
candidate Valery Tsepkalo, and Maria 
Kolesnikova, the former campaign 
manager of Babariko. By joining forces, 
these “three ladies” have two key ad-
vantages. First, they are not members 
of the old Belarusian democratic op-
position, which has been defeated in 
every previous election. Second, they 
can be bolstered by the backers of 
Babariko and Tsepkalo, genuine, bot-
tom-up politicians who have already 
proven themselves in business and 
politics and enjoy the grassroots sup-
port of wide segments of Belarusian 
society. From this perspective, one 
can see similarities to the recent elec-
tions of Slovakian President Zuzana 
Čaputová or Ukrainian President 
Volodymyr Zelenskyi, both of whom 
were political newcomers who suc-
cessfully challenged both the incum-
bents and opposition.
So far, the regime has employed both 
information deterrence and demon-
strative use of force in order to pre-
vent further political mobilization. 
Supporters of the opposition have 
been abducted from busy streets by 
officers in plain clothes, and hundreds 
are getting arrested on administrative 
charges. While state television aired 
news about a brutal riot police unit 
that is fanatically loyal to Lukashenko, 
the president himself has sworn pub-
licly that he will prevent any Maidan-
type scenario from taking place in 
Belarus. As yet, violence has remained 
individually targeted, and no mass 
crackdown have taken place.
In addition, the regime has ensured 
that election observation will be lim-
ited. Because the Belarusian Foreign 
Ministry sent its invitation to the Or-
ganization for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe so late that long-term 
international observation was made 
impossible, the OSCE is not send-
ing observers. Moreover, Belarus’s 
CEC limited domestic observation by 
claiming the need to maintain social 
distancing due to the COVID-19 pan-
demic. The regime has also established 
many other administrative measures to 
ensure the expected result.
Because it is forbidden to publish elec-
tion-related opinion polls in Belarus, 
no data-based comparison between 
the candidates is possible. Still, several 
unofficial surveys, as well as the pub-
lished numbers of signatures collected 
to nominate candidates, indicate that 
the president’s popularity is relatively 
low, particularly in Minsk. Meanwhile, 
mass attendance at the gatherings 
of the three ladies demonstrate that 
they are indeed popular and have sub-
stantial potential to mobilize voters. 
Since people have taken to the streets 
for a last-minute presidential candi-
date joined by two other women who 
are not even on the ballot, it is unlike-
ly that this protest mood will disappear 
after the election. Therefore, the at-
mosphere poses a serious challenge to 
Lukashenko’s system.
POST-ELECTION  
PERIOD IS OF CRUCIAL  
IMPORTANCE
The Belarusian opposition has tra-
dit ional ly organized large-scale 
demonstrations in Minsk on the eve 
of presidential elections. The pro-
tests in 2006 and 2010 were smashed; 
even prominent opposition politicians 
were beaten and arrested. In the post-
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Crimea geopolitical context, howev-
er, Belarusian authorities have been 
a lot less repressive. The fact that the 
2015 presidential election was managed 
smoothly, without any major crack-
downs, paved the way for the EU to lift 
most of its sanctions on Belarus in 2016.
Consequently, how the regime will 
handle the opposition in the few days 
left until the August 9 election – and 
particularly thereafter – is crucially 
important. Geopolitical consider-
ations could still point to a relatively 
light-handed treatment of election- 
related protests. The current opposi-
tion, however, has been much different 
from anything that Lukashenko has yet 
to face. Moreover, due to his low pop-
ularity, the official results are going 
to be less in line with the population’s 
real preferences than ever before. 
Hence, genuinely angry opposition 
protests cannot be ruled out. An ex-
ternal actor – most likely, Russia – 
could use the opportunity to fuel these 
protests through meddling, caus-
ing the regime to overreact. If a major 
crackdown, similar to the one in 2010, 
can be provoked, it would endanger 
Lukashenko’s normalization efforts 
with the West, thus serving Russia’s 
interests.
LITTLE GREEN 
MEN AGAIN?
The possibility of Russian meddling 
made the July 29 detention of 33 Rus-
sian citizens by Belarusian authorities 
breaking news. According to Belaru-
sian officials, the Russians, who were 
accused of being members of the 
Wagner Group, a Russian private mili-
tary company, were in touch with the 
Tikhanovsky team and belonged to 
a larger group of approximately 200 
operatives whose task was to stage 
provocations during the election. The 
news story had a prologue. On July 24, 
during a visit to a special forces base, 
Lukashenko announced that private 
military contractors could arrive from 
abroad and the Belarusian military 
would need to be ready to “prevent an 
escalation.”
Whatever the real reason for the pres-
ence of those Russians in Belarus was – 
a plausible explanation is that they were 
en route to a mission in a third country 
– Lukashenko apparently decided to in-
strumentalize the incident in both do-
mestic and foreign policy. By blaming 
Tikhanovsky, he delivered a blow to the 
opposition. By accusing Russia, he cre-
ated a narrative that he could later use 
both at home and in Moscow. Despite 
the stalled Union State project – an old, 
Russian-led quasi-supranational inte-
gration project between the two coun-
tries – Moscow has consistently tried to 
curtail the economic, financial, military, 
and political sovereignty of Belarus.
NORMALIZATION OF 
EU-BELARUS RELATIONS  
MUST CONTINUE
Unless serious repressions occur 
during or after the election, the EU 
needs to continue its cautious nor-
malization process with Belarus, thus 
helping Minsk to counterbalance 
pressure from Moscow. The lifting 
of EU sanctions in 2016 was a land-
mark result of this process, as is the 
agreement on visa facilitation and re-
admission between the EU and Belarus 
that came into force on July 1, 2020. 
Though there is no valid Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement between 
the EU and Belarus, which is a pre-
requisite for any deeper institutional-
ization of bilateral ties, there are still 
other options to pursue. It is import-
ant, for example, to further strength-
en economic, business, and investment 
ties between Belarus and the West, 
thus decreasing Minsk’s dependence 
on Moscow. Because membership in 
the World Trade Organization could 
make Belarus a significantly more at-
tractive partner for Western investors – 
including German ones – it is in the 
best interest of the EU and Germany to 
foster Belarus’s accession to the WTO. 
If a major crackdown takes place or 
people are imprisoned on political 
charges, the EU needs an answer that 
acts as a strong deterrent, preventing 
a further deterioration of the situation 
while not negating the results of the 
normalization process. After an ini-
tial response from High Representative 
Josep Borrell, the European Council 
could follow up on the statement made 
on June 1, 2020, by Robert Biedroń, 
chair of the European Parliament’s 
Delegation for Relations with Belarus, 
and Petras Auštrevičius, the European 
Parliament’s standing rapporteur on 
Belarus. In it, they demanded the re-
view of the EU’s policy toward Minsk 
and suggested new sanctions targeting 
the officials responsible for more re-
pressions, should they occur. In order 
not to alienate the Belarusian popula-
tion, these sanctions should precisely 
target the personal and economic as-
sets of regime leaders.
While cooperating with an authori-
tarian regime is indeed controversial 
and may make it harder for the EU to 
conduct a credible dialogue on human 
rights with external partners, support-
ing the Belarusian president in order 
to preserve the country’s sovereignty 
vis-à-vis Russia is crucially important 
for the EU’s own security interests.
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